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INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MYSTERY: HOLDING
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS LIABLE FOR
DEFAMATION AND THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]here is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no
sense."'  This statement has never been more accurate than it is today.
Libel law 2 attempts to balance two fundamental interests-freedom of
speech and freedom from defamation. 3  However, balancing these two
interests has become extremely difficult with the advent of the Internet.
The development of the Internet provides the opportunity to share
one's views with the public. 4  This ease of Internet publishing creates
international aspects of libel not previously considered by traditional
publishers.5 In 1996, the District Court of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found at least forty percent of Internet content originates
outside the United States.6 Regardless of origin, Internet publications are
not limited by boundaries.7  There is vast potential for worldwide
humiliation and economic disaster for a victim of libel.8  Meanwhile, the
1. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
2. "Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing .. " CAL. CIV. CODE § 45
(West 2001).
3. THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS vii (Everette E. Dennis &
Eli M. Noam eds., 1989) [hereinafter THE COST OF LIBEL].
4. See F. LAWRENCE STREET & MARK P. GRANT, LAW OF THE INTERNET xxvii (2000).
5. E.g., Lilian Edwards, Defamation and the Internet: Name-calling in Cyberspace, in LAW
AND THE INTERNET 183, 183-84 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 1997). Although an
ISP has not been held a traditional "publisher" in legal terms (see Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe,
Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)), this Comment often uses the word publisher in the non-
legal manner. "Publisher" used in the legal manner is differentiated by quotation marks.
6. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 848 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
(finding 117).
7. See Edwards, supra note 5.
8. See Michael Holland, Libel on the Internet: An International Problem, (May 10, 1996) at
http://wings.buffalo.edu/Complaw/CompLawPapers/holland.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001).
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Internet Service Provider ("ISP") transmitting the libel is exposed to legal
liabilities in multiple countries. 9
Currently, Internet libel is policed by an inadequate country-by-
country approach. While the United States refuses to hold ISPs liable for
the content of a defamatory statement,10 other countries have addressed the
issue by enacting statutes providing for specific instances of liability.'
Economic costs of publishing increase for ISPs that must operate under the
laws of multiple jurisdictions. 12  As a result, these costs may lead to a
decrease in the amount of information disseminated, as ISPs may refrain
from publishing for fear of legal liability.' 3 This is contrary to the true
nature of the Internet, which if regulated properly, can result in an
enhancement of free speech.'
4
This Comment discusses the weaknesses of the current country-by-
country approach by which ISPs are held legally responsible for publishing
libel. Part II discusses the background of libel law and the economic
concerns ISPs must consider when publishing libelous statements on the
Internet. Part III compares the approaches to Internet libel law taken in
various countries and the policy reasons behind the laws. Part IV analyzes
current Internet libel law at the international level and argues the necessity
for a revision regarding its treatment. Additionally, Part IV proposes a
system that corrects defamatory statements with truth, rather than money,
should be used to police libelous statements on the Internet. Finally, Part
IV concludes such a truth-based system would better address the
international aspects of publishing on the Internet, and the resulting
economic consequences.
9. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 184.
10. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
11. See infra Part 1lI.
12. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 183-84 (discussing that Internet libel defendants can file
suit in multiple countries, which enhances problems facing traditional publishers).
13. See .Dieter Huber, United States, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY: CIVIL
LIABILITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 375, 406 (Christian Campbell ed., 1997) (discussing the
chilling effect of punitive damages).
14. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 882. The court notes that "[s]ome of the dialogue on the
Internet surely tests the limits of conventional discourse .... But we should expect such speech
to occur in a medium in which citizens from all walks of life have a voice." Id.
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I1. BACKGROUND
A. The Role of the ISP in Internet Publishing
In exchange for a monthly fee, ISPs provide access to the Internet' 5
and other Internet-based services such as e-mail, Internet relay chat
capability, bulletin boards and web space for personal home pages. 16
Defamatory statements are transmitted by ISPs in various manners. 
7
For example, a statement may be posted on a bulletin board, made in a
"chat" discussion or sent via an e-mail service provided by the ISP.' 8
When an ISP is the author of the defamatory statement, the law is relatively
straightforward and liability is clear.' 9 However, when the defamatory
statement is authored by another, and subsequently transmitted through the
ISP, the law is unclear and has resulted in an abundance of litigation.2 °
B. Traditional Standards of Defamation
Defamation is defined as an oral or written invasion of a person's
reputation or good name.21 An oral defamatory statement is referred to as
slander, and a written defamatory statement is referred to as libel. 2  In
California, a statement is libelous if it is "a false and unprivileged
publication by writing ... which exposes any person to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or
which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. 23 Defamation laws
are intended to protect the reputation of a person.24 Originally, defamation
law focused on preserving one's regard within their community because of
the individual's economic interests in upholding a strong reputation.
25
15. See RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., MULTIMEDIA LAW § 10.01 [3] (2000).
16. See id.
17. See KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 2.03[2] (2000) (discussing on-
line communication through the use of text or recorded images versus live discussion).
18. See id. § 2.03[1].
19. See id.
20. See discussion infra Part Ill.
21. PROSSER & KEETON supra note 1, § 11, at 771.
22. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 45, 46 (West 2001).
23. Id. § 45.
24. SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND
"MORAL RIGHTS" 1 (1988).
25. Finley P. Maxson, Note, A Pothole on the Information Superhighway: BBS Operator
Liability for Defamatory Statements, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 673, 677 (1997).
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A common law cause of action for slander consists of three elements:
the publication of a defamatory statement to a third party, fault and
damages. 26  However, in a common law libel suit, the plaintiff is not
required to prove actual damages.27 This is because written words are
permanent, more widely circulated, and theoretically more harmful to a
person's reputation than spoken words.28
The unique nature of the Internet raises uncertainty about applying
traditional libel laws to ISPs. 29 An ISP does not create defamatory
statements, but merely acts as a conduit for the statements of its
subscribers.30 In the United States, a traditional (non-ISP) defendant, such
as a newspaper publisher, is not liable for defamation unless it has
"published" the defamatory material.31 In this context, "published" refers
to a defendant's reproduction of the statement and subsequent delivery or
32transmission. Meanwhile, a defendant who merely distributes the
defamatory material, such as a newsstand, is subject to liability only if it
knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.33
Because ISPs are not traditional publishers, there may be confusion as
to their potential liability for publishing defamatory material.34 Moreover,
defamatory statements are often published anonymously on the Internet. a5
Thus, applying traditional libel standards to ISPs is problematic and the
laws regarding Internet libel are constantly changing.
36
26. Alexander Gigante, Ice Patch on the Information Superhighway: Foreign Liability for
Domestically Created Content, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 523, 526 (1996).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Holland, supra note 8.
30. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 191-92.
31. PROSSER& KEETON supra note 1, at 802.
32. See id. at 803.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977); see also KENT D. STUCKEY,
supra note 17, § 2.03[3][a][ii].
34. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 191-95. But see Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F.
Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In the United States, "distributors" of on-line material are not liable
unless they knew or had reason to know of the defamation, whereas "publishers" of on-line
material are held liable. Id. at 139, 141. The court in Cubby held CompuServe was a distributor
because it had little editorial control over its subscribers. Id.
35. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 886 (2000).
36. See Holland, supra note 8.
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C. The Economic Problems Relating to the Possibility of a Defamation
Lawsuit Can Cause a Chilling Effect
Although publishing on the Internet is generally less expensive than
other traditional modes of publishing, inherent risks do exist.37  For
instance, if defamatory material is disseminated internationally via the
Internet, publishers may be forced to defend claims throughout the world.38
Furthermore, there is no central body of law governing the Internet. 39 Thus,
jurisdiction and choice of law issues are complex.4"
A publisher who places material on the Internet faces the possibility
of legal liability.4 ' Consequently, publishers must weigh the economic
benefits of producing a story against the likelihood of litigation.42  If
publishers fear litigation, this balancing could create a "chilling-effect,"
causing an ISP to refrain from publishing.
43
III. ISP LIABILITY IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES FOR DEFAMATION
There is no true consensus among the ways different countries treat
Internet libel.44 Some countries hold ISPs responsible for defamatory
statements while others hold the original writer of the statement
responsible.45 This is problematic for ISPs that attempt to base their
publications on pre-existing law.4 6
37. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 183-84.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 197 (discussing the accepted view that single nation legislative strategies are
fruitless and a multi-national agreement is better suited for policing the Internet).
40. See id. at 184. A discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Comment.
41. See id. at 191.
42. See id.
43. E.g., LOIS G. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND
INVASION OF PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17 (1987) (discussing freedom of
expression should not be "chilled" by the actions of the courts).
44. See Stan Morris, The Importance of International Laws for Web Publishers, (June 2000)
at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/morris-2000-06-p2.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2001)
(explaining laws in the United States may conflict with the laws in other countries).
45. Compare Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd., 1999 E.M.L.R. 542 (Q.B.) (Eng.), with
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52-53 (D.D.C. 1998). (elucidating that an ISP in
England can be liable regardless of notice of the defamatory statement, whereas in the United
States, the current trend is to insulate ISPs from liability).
46. See Peter Bartlett & Minter Ellison, Australia, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY:
CIVIL LIABILITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 3, 13 (Christian Campbell ed., 1997).
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A. The Long Road to Insulating ISPs from Liability in the United States
The United States first litigated an Internet libel case in 1991.
47
Consequently, United States case law is considered valuable precedent in
foreign libel cases.48
1. How Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.49 Began to Insulate ISPs from
Liability in the United States
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc. was one of the leading cases applying
libel law to an ISP rather than traditional media such as newspapers. 50 The
court in Cubby ultimately held an ISP is not liable for defamatory
statements made by one of its subscribers.5 1 CompuServe, the ISP and
defendant in Cubby, provided an online "library" that subscribers could
access through the Internet.52 Additionally, CompuServe maintained a
number of electronic forums that appealed to various groups.53
"Rumorville," the subject of the suit, was an online publication available on
the "Journalism Forum. 5 4 Cubby, the plaintiff and creator of a similar
forum called "Skuttlebut," 55 claimed false statements were published about
Skuttlebut in the Journalism Forum.56
Rumorville was published by a separate company, Don Fitzpatrick
Associates ("DFA"), which had no contractual relationship with
CompuServe.57  CompuServe did have a contract with Cameron
Communications, Inc. ("CCI"), an independent company, to "'manage,
review, create, delete, edit and otherwise control the contents' of the
Journalism Forum... ,,58 Furthermore, CCI and DFA entered into a
47. See F. LAWRENCE STREET & MARK P. GRANT, LAW OF THE INTERNET 644 (2001).
48. See generally Godfrey, E.M.L.R. at 609 (providing a detailed discussion and ultimately
disagreeing with United States case law).
49. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
50. See STREET & GRANT, supra note 47, at 773-74.
51. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 141.
52. Id. at 137. This "library" was an online general information service that the CompuServe
subscribers could access from their own computers. Id.
53. Id. The "forums" included electronic bulletin boards, interactive online conferences,
and topical databases that appealed to special interests. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 138.
56. Id.
57. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137.
58. Id.
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contract in which DFA accepted total responsibility for the contents of
Rumorville. 59
According to preexisting law, if CompuServe was found to be a
"publisher" of the defamatory material, it would be held strictly liable. 60
On the other hand, if CompuServe was found to be a mere distributor of the
material, similar to a newspaper vendor or library, no liability would attach
unless it knew or had reason to know of the defamation.6' Cubby relied on
Smith v. California,62 in which the Supreme Court refused to hold a
bookseller liable for possession of an obscene book.63 The court explained
a bookseller cannot possibly know the content of every book it carries, and
it is therefore unreasonable to demand such editorial control.64 In addition,
the Smith court said the burden of such restrictions would negatively
impact the public because the public would lose access to such content.65
Cubby employed Smith's reasoning to relieve CompuServe of liability.
66
Because DFA directly uploaded the text of Rumorville into the
CompuServe site, the court found CompuServe had minimal editorial
control over the publication process. 67 The court stated CompuServe's role
was similar to the role of a traditional news distributor and therefore,
CompuServe was not liable.68 The decision in Cubby represented a step
forward for ISP protection. Armed with Cubby, ISPs could claim
constitutional protection for allegedly libelous statements on their websites
of which they had no knowledge.69
2. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.70 Penalizes an ISP for
Exercising Editorial Control
In contrast to Cubby, the court in Stratton found Prodigy, an ISP,
liable for defamatory statements made in a public online forum. 71  In
59. Id.
60. See id. at 139 (citing Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980),
quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977)).
61. Id. at 139 (citing Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Macaluso v. Mondadori Publ'g Co., 527 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)).
62. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
63. See id. at 155; Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139.
64. Smith, 361 U.S. at 153 (citting The King v. Ewart, 25 N.Z.L.R. 709, 729 (C.A.)).
65. Id.
66. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139-41.
67. Id. at 140.
68. Id. at 140-41.
69. STREET & GRANT, supra note 47, at 791.
70. No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
71. See id. at *14.
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Stratton, a Prodigy user posted a message on a Prodigy bulletin board
called "Money Talk., 72 The message alleged that Daniel Porush, President
of Stratton Oakmont, Inc., a securities investment banking firm, was "soon
to be proven criminal. 7 3 The message also stated Stratton Oakmont was
"a cult of brokers who either lie for a living or get fired."'74 In denying
liability, Prodigy based its defense on Cubby,75 and argued it was merely a
"distributor., 76 To the contrary, the court held Prodigy was a "publisher"
and was therefore liable.77
Stratton has significantly impacted Internet libel law in the United
States. First, the decision identifies how an ISP can avoid prosecution for
defamatory statements.78 The Stratton court concluded that Prodigy held
itself out as a "'family-oriented' computer service" by claiming editorial
control over messages posted on its bulletin boards and by actively utilizing
an automatic software screening program to filter content. 79 Based on these
factors, the court found Prodigy was a "publisher" and was liable for the
defamatory statements published on its site. 0 Conversely, a lack of
editorial control over the site will result in no such liability for defamatory
content.8 ' Thus, under Stratton, to preclude prosecution, an ISP should
avoid exercising any editorial control over content.8 2
Second, Stratton acknowledges harsh penalties for defamation could
have a "chilling effect" on online communication. 3 The "essence of a
chilling effect is an act of deterrence. '' 84 The concern is that penalties on
those who communicate defamatory statements may actually over-deter
truthful and nondefamatory speech, due to the fear created by such
penalties.85 With regard to the Internet, there is concern defamation law
72. Id. at * 1. The "Money Talk" bulletin board was supposedly the most widely read
financial computer bulletin board in the United States. Id. at *3.
73. Id. at *2.
74. Id.
75. See id. at *8 (citing Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 135).
76. See Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *8-9.
77. Id. at * 10-11.
78. See id. at *12-14.
79. Id. at *13-14.
80. Id. at *10-11.
81. See id. at "13.
82. See Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *13.
83. See id. at *12.
84. Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling
Effect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685, 689 (1978) (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965);
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm'n., 372 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1963)).
85. Id. at 693.
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will deter users from freely expressing ideas.86 Furthermore, the economic
dangers of a libel suit may cause an ISP to cease publication.87
In its discussion of concerns about the potential chilling of online
communication, 88 the Stratton court referenced Auvil v. CBS "60
Minutes. "89 In Auvil, the court examined the liability of CBS and its
affiliates for broadcasting an allegedly defamatory segment concerning the
risks of using Alar, a growth regulator, in the apple industry. 90 The court in
Auvil reasoned imposing a duty to censor on the CBS local affiliates would
be highly unrealistic. 9' Furthermore, the Auvil court found such a duty
would be economically burdensome,92 and would chill the "media's right
of expression and the public's right to know. 9 3
Although Prodigy exercised editorial control in Stratton, the decision
may have effectively increased the amount of information available to
citizens. Thus, after Stratton, an ISP might refrain from exerting editorial
control over its site in order to protect itself from potential liability if
defamatory information is overlooked. 94 However, ISPs' decisions were
undoubtedly influenced by pending versions of the Communications
Decency Act 95 as well.
3. The Communications Decency Act 96 Overruled Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Services Co.
9 7
The Communications Decency Act ("CDA") was enacted in 1996 as
an attempt "to overhaul numerous provisions of the Communications Act
of 1934." 98 Section 230(c) of the CDA states "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider." 99
86. See Lidsky, supra note 35, at 890.
87. See Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of
Process in LibelLitigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1789 (1998).
88. See Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *12.
89. 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
90. See id. at 930.
91. See id. at 932.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See STREET & GRANT, supra note 47, at 781 (discussing that an ISP would likely be
held liable if it attempted to exert editorial control over its site).
95. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. IV 1999).
96. Id.
97. No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
98. STREET & GRANT, supra note 47, at 792.
99. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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Specifically, § 230 provides ISPs are not liable for actions that restrict
objectionable material.' 00
Congress' intent in enacting § 230 was to overrule Stratton Oaknont
v. Prodigy.10 Congress recognized Stratton treated ISPs as "publishers,"
and this in fact resulted in an effect contrary to the prevailing federal policy
of allowing parents to regulate their children's Internet viewing.,0 2  In
particular, Congress believed that cases similar to Stratton would force
ISPs to stop policing their sites to avoid possible libel suits. 0 3 Congress
was concerned that after Stratton, ISPs would refuse to police their sites
and allow offensive material to flourish on the Internet.
0 4
The effect of the CDA was a return to a Cubby-like era of distributor
liability. 10 5  By enacting the CDA, Congress allowed ISPs to exercise
editorial control over their sites without risking liability as "publishers."'
0 6
However, until the courts applied the CDA, there was no way of knowing
whether Congress would achieve these goals.
4. Zeran v. America Online, Inc.10 7 Rejects Stratton °8
The Zeran court was the first to apply the CDA and effectively
reverse Stratton.10 9 In Zeran, an unknown user listed the plaintiff's phone
number and address on an America Online ("AOL") bulletin board
advertising distasteful merchandise connected to the Oklahoma City
bombing." 0  The plaintiff alleged the posting of the material led to
harassment and numerous death threats"' and sued AOL claiming it was
negligent in allowing the posting of the notices." 12
The plaintiff argued even though § 230 of the CDA eliminated
liability for "publishers," it still provided liability for service providers such
100. Id. § 230(c)(2).
101. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
102. See id.
103. See id.; see also Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory E-Mail and Employer Liability:
Why Razing Zeran v. America Online Is a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25, 9 (Spring
2000), at http://www.urich.edu/%7Ejolt/v6i5/article4.html.
104. Spencer, supra note 104, 9.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
108. Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229.
109. See Defamation and the Internet: Major Court Cases, at http://cse.stanford.edu/
class/cs201/proj...e-intemet/sections/precedent/cases.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001).
110. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 329-30.
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as AOL." 13 The CDA states an online service provider shall not "be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."' 14 This section of the CDA was specifically
enacted by Congress to overrule Stratton. 15 However, the plaintiff argued
that § 230 also invoked liability for ISPs with notice of defamatory material
posted via their services." 16
The district court found "'[e]very one who takes part in the
publication.., is charged with publication.""' 17 The Zeran court destroyed
the distinction between a "publisher" and a "distributor" clearly set out in
cases such as Stratton and Cubby.1 8  The court held AOL met the
traditional definition of a "publisher" and was thus protected by the
immunity conferred by §230 of the CDA.19
5. Blumenthal v. Drudge120 Follows the Reasoning of Zeran
Blumenthal v. Drudge had important ramifications for the suppression
of newsworthy information. Matt Drudge, an Internet columnist and
publisher of his own website known as the "Drudge Report,"' 2' reported
that Sidney Blumenthal, President Clinton's advisor, abused his wife.
22
The Blumenthals sued Drudge and AOL for libel. 123  The court in
Blumenthal, relying upon Zeran, concluded the CDA gave ISPs immunity
from liability as an incentive for ISPs to police themselves for obscenity
and offensive material.' 24 The Blumenthal court believed this incentive
was enough, "even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even
attempted,"'125 and held the CDA barred Blumenthal's claim against
AOL. 126
113. See id. at 331.
114. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
115. STREET & GRANT, supra note 47, at 793; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
116. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
117. Id. at 332 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON § 113, at 799).
118. See id.; Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229; Cubby, 776 F. Supp. 135.
119. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
120. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
121. See id. at 47.
122. See id. at 46.
123. See id. at 46-48.
124. See id. at 52-53.
125. See id. at 52.
126. See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52.
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The decision in Blumenthal insulated ISPs from liability for
defamatory content, 127 and thus initially appears as a victory for the First
Amendment. It is arguable the amount of information available on the
Internet will increase because ISPs no longer fear liability for defamation 128
and thus, will not be deterred from publishing. However, Blumenthal could
cause the exact opposite result.
Prior to Blumenthal, ISPs with deep pockets were easy targets for
defamation suits. 129 However, since ISPs are no longer chargeable, the
libeled plaintiff may pursue the source of the defamatory communication-
the originator of the comment. 130 Because these individuals do not usually
have the deep pockets of a large ISP, they might be deterred from
publishing for fear of litigation.'
31
B. England's Pro-Plaintiff Approach
The English approach to defamation is in direct contrast to American
defamation law. 132 In England, a publisher of defamatory material may be
liable regardless of whether the publisher has notice of the defamatory
content of its publication. 133  Additionally, English law presumes the
defamatory statement is false, leaving the defendant with the burden of
proving the truthfulness of the statement. 134 Consequently, plaintiffs will
prefer to bring defamation suits in England where a higher probability of
success exists. 135
Prior to 1996, ISP liability in England depended on the categorization
of the service provider.' 36 Courts sought to determine whether an ISP was
a publisher, printer, distributor or vendor because each classification
invoked different liabilities. 137 The English legislature attempted to resolve
problems created by such characterizations by forcing new technological
127. See id. at 52-53.
128. See generally Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. 44.
129. See Lydsky, supra note 35, at 868-70.
130. See id. at 872.
131. See id.; see also STREET & GRANT, supra note 47, at 784.
132. See Eric J. McCarthy, Comment, Networking in Cyberspace: Electronic Defamation
and the Potential for International Forum Shopping, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 527, 552-553
(1995).
133. STREET & GRANT, supra note 47, at 787.
134. See McCarthy, supra note 133.
135. Id.
136. See Alan Williams et al., England and Wales, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY:
CIVIL LIABILITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 107, 111 (Christian Campbell ed., 1997).
137. See id.
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entities into the confines of defamation law with the Defamation Act of
1996 ("Defamation Act").1
38
1. The Defamation Act
The Defamation Act provides a three-pronged defense to avoid
liability for defamation.139 The Act allows an ISP to avoid liability if the
ISP: 1) is not the "author, editor or publisher" of the defamatory statement;
2) took "reasonable care in relation to its publication" and 3) can
demonstrate it did "not know, and had no reason to believe, that what [it]
did caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement."'1
40
The Act further provides an entity is not considered an "author, editor,
or publisher" if it is only involved in the distribution or selling of an
electronic medium, or if it is an operator or provider of an electronic
medium on "which the statement is retrieved, copied, distributed or made
available in electronic form."' 141 Moreover, under the Defamation Act, an
ISP is not considered the author if it is involved in the operation of, or is
the provider of, access to a communications system on which the statement
is transmitted by a person over whom it has no control.
142
These sections, which were intended to insulate ISPs from liability for
defamatory content, 143 were tested in Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd. 44
2. Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd. 145 Applies the Defamation Act
In Godfrey, an anonymous user posted a message on the defendant
ISP's network allegedly containing "squalid, obscene and defamatory"
content directed at the plaintiff. 46 Demon, the ISP, claimed it was not a
"publisher" under English common law and denied liability for the posted
message.147 Alternatively, Demon claimed even if it were a "publisher," it
could nonetheless invoke the defenses available in the Defamation Act. 1
48
138. Id. at 112.
139. Defamation Act, 1996, ch. 31, § 1(1) (Eng.).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 1(3).
142. Id.
143. See Williams, supra note 137, at 112-13.
144. 1999 E.M.L.R. 542 (Q.B.) (Eng.).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 545.
147. See id. at 544.
148. See id.
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Although the court held Demon was not a "publisher," it went a step
further and concluded Demon could not plead the defenses provided in the
Defamation Act. 149 The court based this conclusion on the fact that Demon
had notice of the defamatory statement on its server. 150  Specifically,
Demon's Managing Director received a fax from the plaintiff notifying him
of the problem. 15' According to the court, the defenses provided in the
Defamation Act were a version of the common law defense of innocent
dissemination, which forestalls liability if one is unaware of the defamatory
nature of a statement. 152 Therefore, the court recognized it was improper to
provide such a defense to a defendant who was aware of a potentially
harmful statement directed at the plaintiff.
153
In reaching its conclusion, the Godfrey court discussed United States
defamation law. 154 Cubby, Stratton and Zeran were invoked to illustrate the
differences between English and American law.' 55 The court explained the
Defamation Act does not serve the same purpose as the CDA, and that the
American cases were only of "marginal assistance because of the different
approach to defamation across the Atlantic."' 156  The court therefore
followed the Defamation Act, and held an English ISP must remove
allegedly libelous material immediately upon notice of the material's
existence on its server.
157
Because of a recent pro-plaintiff English ruling, it is possible there
will be a "rush of libel claimants to London.' ' 158  The ruling at issue
concerned whether a Russian businessman could sue Forbes, an American
magazine, in a British court. 159 Although Forbes argued the case should be
brought in either Russia or the United States, the House of Lords allowed
the case heard in England.
160
The implications of this ruling are enormous. When coupled with the
ruling of Godfrey, England will perpetuate its reputation as a place where
149. See id. at 554-55.
150. Godfrey, E.M.L.R. at 554-55.
151. Id. at 545-46.
152. See id. at 544.
153. See id. at 554-55.
154. See id. at 550-54.
155. See Godfrey, E.M.L.R. at 550-54.
156. See id. at 550.
157. See, e.g., Defamation Act, 1996, ch. 31, § 1(1) (Eng.); see also David Hooper,
Goodbye Libel, Hello Privacy, TIMES (London), Mar. 28, 2000.
158. Frances Gibb, Russian Free to Sue in Britain, TIMES (London), May 12, 2000.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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libel suits are welcomed. 61  Thus, it is conceivable that one who feels
libeled is prudent to plead one's case in the English court system. 162 An
injured party from the United States may "in the future flee the fault
requirements of the Constitution and seek redress in more media-hostile
jurisdictions."' 163 The differences between American and English libel law
observed in Godfrey are ripe for scholarly examination, as a comprehensive
solution regarding libel on the Internet remains elusive.
C. Japan Invokes ISP Liability for the Posting of a Subscriber
Japan takes a more lenient approach toward regulating the Internet
than most countries) 64 There, the Electronic Network Consortium, an
Internet industry association of software developers and Internet
companies, has mapped out a series of guidelines requiring the use of
"good manners" on the Internet. 165 These guidelines include the principle
that a user should never post a defamatory message on a computer bulletin
board. 66 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which worked
with the Consortium on the drafting of the guidelines, does not foresee the
need to implement future Internet laws because of its strong belief Internet
users will adhere to the guidelines. 1
67
In spite of these guidelines, Japan's Internet industry is not free of
defamation. 168  In a recent case, NiftyServe, a major Japanese online
service, was sued after it failed to remove an offensive statement from one
of its bulletin board forums. 16 9  This case is similar to Cubby in that
NiftyServe, like CompuServe, had contracted with an independent
company to monitor and control the editorial content of its forums. 70
161. Cf. McCarthy, supra note 133, at 561 (stating British defamation law favors plaintiffs
by providing them with a more favorable forum).
162. See id.
163. Michael Smyth & Nick Braithwaite, First U.K. Bulletin Board Defamation Suit
Brought: English Courts May Be the Better Forum for Plaintiffs Charging Defamation in
Cyberspace, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1994, at CI0, C12.
164. See generally Holland, supra note 8 (comparing attitudes towards Internet regulation in
the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and Singapore).
165. Id.; see also Rieko Mashima & Katsuya Hirose, From "Dial-a-Porn " to "Cyberporn
Approaches to and Limitations of Regulation in the United States and Japan, at
http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol2/issue2/mashima.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001).
166. Mashima & Hirose, supra note 166.
167. Id.
168. See Defamation in Cyberspace under Japanese Law (Narafumi Kadomatsu trans.)
(May 1988), at http://www.law.kyushu-u.ac.jp/-luke/kadocase.html (translated summary of
Tokyo District Court Opinion, 1610 Hanrei Jiho 22ff, denying liability to ISP and its employee).
169. See Mashima & Hirose, supra note 166, at n.4 1.
170. See id.
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However, NiftyServe failed to adequately supervise the company.
171
Accordingly, the Tokyo district court ruled against NiftyServe on a
vicarious liability theory and ordered the company to pay damages to the
plaintiff.
17 2
Traditional defamation claims are expected to increase in Japan.
173
However, Japanese courts traditionally award low damages in comparison
to international standards, suggesting an under evaluation of an individual's
intangible rights. 174 The past infringement of personal rights, coupled with
the incredible growth of Japan's Internet industry, indicates Japan's libel
laws are in need of reform.
D. Australia's Slight Consideration of Internet Libel
Although Australia is the fourth largest user of the Internet behind
Sweden, Finland and the United States,'75 judicial consideration of online
libel suits in Australia is scarce. 176 Thus, the Australian judiciary must
draw analogies to already existing principles of Australian defamation
law. 1
77
Urbanchich v. Drummoyne Municipal Council178 is a potentially
important case in the development of Australia's online defamation law.
The reasoning in Urbanchich, which held a defendant liable for failing to
remove a defamatory publication, 179 could potentially apply to ISPs. The
plaintiff in Urbanchich successfully argued the defendant's failure to
remove defamatory posters from defendant's property after notification
constituted publication.' 80  The court reasoned by failing to remove the
posters, the defendant "accepted responsibility" for continued
publication. '81
Urbanchich can be construed as a warning to Australian ISPs to
remove suspect statements after notification of defamatory content in order
171. See Kadomatsu, supra note 169.
172. See id.
173. See Masao Horibe & John Middleton, Japan, in, INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY:
CIVIL LIABILITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 219, 239 (Christian Campbell ed., 1997).
174. See id.
175. Mark Armstrong et al., Australia, in REGULATING THE CHANGING MEDIA 247, 251
(David Goldberg et al. eds., 1998).
176. See Bartlett & Ellison, supra note 46, at 13.
177. Id.
178. 1988 N.S.W. LEXIS 8802 (N.S.W. Austl. Dec. 22, 1988).
179. Id. at *17.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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to avoid liability. 182 The case is comparable to English law, which holds an
ISP liable after notification of a defamatory statement, 183 and offers a
defense if the ISP lacked notice of the defamatory statement. 184 Similarly,
Urbanchich provides that failure to remove a posting after notification of
its defamatory content constitutes responsibility for its publication.
185
Australian statutory law provides an ISP may be liable for statements
posted by another unless the ISP proves it is an innocent distributor.' 86 In
order to avoid liability, the ISP must prove: 1) it lacked knowledge of the
defamatory nature of the material; 2) it did not know the material was
likely to be defamatory and 3) this lack of knowledge was not due to the
ISP's negligence.' 87 This rule seems to classify the ISP as a "distributor,"
as opposed to a "publisher," which is similar to the CDA's classification as
a "distributor" in the United States.' 88 The fact that Australian libel law is
similar to United States libel law is not surprising considering the United
States was the leader in litigating such issues, 189 and the Australian media
closely monitors United States libel law developments.'
90
Rindos v. Hardwick'91 is the only decision specifically related to
Internet defamation in Australia. 192  In Rindos, the plaintiff claimed
defamation by statements published on an anthropology Internet bulletin
board. 193 The case provides little analysis of Internet defamation principles
because the issues were never litigated as the case was undefended and
resulted in a default judgment for the plaintiff. 194 However, Rindos was
important in that it clearly recognized the international aspects of
publication on the Internet, specifically that such a message is accessible
worldwide.
95
182. See The Internet Law and Policy Forum Working Group on Content Blocking, at
http://www.ilpf.org/work/content/defame.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2001) [hereinafter THE
INTERNET LAW AND POLICY FORUM].
183. See infra pp. 112-115.
184. See infra p. 114.
185. Urbanchich, 1988 N.S.W. LEXIS 8802, at *17.
186. THE INTERNET LAW AND POLICY FORUM, supra note 183.
187. Id.
188. See infra pp. 109-111.
189. See infra notes 47, 48 and accompanying text.
190. See Bartlett & Ellison, supra note 46, at 14.
191. Rindos v. Hardwick (Mar. 31, 1994) (unreported W. Austl. Sup. Ct.), at
http://joc.mit.edu/uwa/rindos/Law/judgement.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Rindos
Case].
192. See Bartlett & Ellison, supra note 46, at 13.
193. Rindos Case, supra note 192.
194. See id.; see also Bartlett & Ellison, supra note 46, at 13.
195. Rindos Case, supra note 192.
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E. Singapore Strictly Regulates the Internet
Singapore's libel laws are perhaps more strict than those of any other
country. 196 Since March 6, 1996, publishers and ISPs in Singapore have
been liable for content placed on the Internet.197  Singapore ISPs must
register with the Singapore Broadcasting Authority ("SBA"), perhaps in an
effort to trace legal liability. 198 Also, similar to Japan, Singapore has
attempted to implement a non-legal alternative to the problem of libel on
the Internet by educating students about Internet etiquette. 199
In July of 1996, the SBA enacted the Class License Scheme for
regulating the Internet. 200  Although the Class License Scheme does not
specifically target defamation, it clearly establishes a unique framework for
Internet regulation. 20 1 The scheme requires every Singapore-based ISP to
register with the SBA, and upon the SBA's request, to turn over all records
relating to its services.0 2 Furthermore, at the direction of the SBA, the ISP
must remove material deemed offensive or against the public interest.0 3
The SBA has clearly attempted to regulate all aspects of the Internet
204in the same way it has regulated television and newspapers. However,
the Class License Scheme specifically addresses that its regulation may
hinder the goal of boosting Singapore's potential as a global information
hub.20 5 Although Singapore has one of the strictest approaches to Internet
regulation in the world,20 6 SBA officials note they take a pragmatic
approach to regulating the Internet. °7 The SBA adds the United States has
undertaken efforts to stop the spread of indecent material on the Internet
and France has attempted to enact a global agreement concerning
196. Holland, supra note 8.
197. Id.
198. Helen Chang, Singapore Wakes Up and Smells the Internet, BUS. WK., Mar. 25, 1996,
at 30; see also Holland, supra note 8.
199. Holland, supra note 8.
200. Press Release, SBA Safeguards Community Interest Through Internet Regulation (July
11, 1996), available at http://www.eff.org/pub/Global/Singapore/Censorship/regulations.
071196.txt [hereinafter SBA Safeguards]; Suzi Seawell et. al., Cyber-Defamation: Same Old
Story or Brave New World? (Summer 1998), at
http://gsulaw.gsu.edu/lawand/papers/su98/defamation (last visited Jan. 11, 1001) (unpublished
class paper, Georgia State University College of Law).
201. See SBA Safeguards, supra note 201.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Holland, supra note 8.
205. See SBA Safeguards, supra note 201.
206. See infra p. 33
207. SBA Safeguards, supra note 201.
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208regulation of the Internet. However, the SBA fails to recognize the
absolute chilling of speech its regulations may cause, in fact, it seems this
chilling is exactly what is intended.2 °9
IV. A PRECARIOUS SITUATION-AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF
THE LAW
Defamation laws of one country may apply to an ISP based in another
country. 2'0  Thus, as long as there is no international model, ISPs must
concern themselves with the laws of multiple jurisdictions. 2 " This may
cause both the ISP and the individual to refrain from publishing
information for fear of liability.2! 1 2 In order to speculate on an appropriate
solution, the current state of libel law must be analyzed.
A. Problems With the Current Laws
1. The Current State of Internet Libel May Cause a Chilling Effect
The Internet libel laws of the United States, England, Japan, Australia
and Singapore create the possibility of a chilling effect. After Zeran, in the
United States, ISPs are no longer liable for defamatory statements
published on their sites.213 Therefore, the plaintiff in a libel action must
bring suit against the source of the published information rather than the
ISP.2 14 Similarly, in Australia, an ISP is not liable if it can prove it is an
"innocent distributor." 215 Thus, in both the United States and Australia it is
not the ISP that is deterred from publishing, but rather the author of the
information.
The Singapore government has also chilled speech.216 One might
argue silencing all libelous statements is beneficial. However, the libel
208. Id.
209. See Holland, supra note 8.
210. See Stan Morris, The Importance of International Laws for Web Publishers, at
http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/morris-2000-06-p3.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001); see also
Gibb, supra note 160 (discussing a libel lawsuit filed by a Russian businessman in the English
House of Lords against Forbes, an American magazine, in May of 2000).
211. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 5, at 183-84; see also Bartlett, supra note 46, at 14.
212. See Schauer, supra note 85, at 693.
213. See supra Part III.A.4.
214. See Lidsky, supra note 130, at 872.
215. THE INTERNET LAW AND POLICY FORUM, supra note 183.
216. See Holland, supra note 8.
2001]
346 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:327
laws in Singapore have great potential for overly deterring the publishing
of newsworthy information because of the fear of punishment.21 v
Similarly, there is likely a strong chilling of speech in Japan, despite
the small damages often awarded in defamation actions.2t 8 The guidelines
implemented by the Electronic Network Consortium are strict and leave
little room for error.2 9 Thus, publishing may be deterred even though it is
not in fact defamatory. Although freedom of expression is highly valued in
Japan, the courts have seen a large increase in the number of defamation
220actions. 0 Such litigation can only increase with the development of the
Internet in Japan.22'
This chilling effect may also be problematic in England due to the
pro-plaintiff approach taken by English law.222 Although the Defamation
Act allows an ISP to avoid liability, Godfrey might be construed as a
warning to refrain from publishing. Furthermore, even if an ISP is allowed
to use the defenses available under the Defamation Act, the plaintiff may
seek action against the author. This will result in deterring the author, thus
producing a chilling effect similar to that of the United States and
Australia. 23
The deleterious consequences of the chilling effect are increased due
to the rising damages awarded from libel actions in numerous countries.224
In England, for example, it is noted although fewer libel suits are brought,
juries still award "thumping damages" against media defendants of whom
225they disapprove. In the future, due to the rise in damages awarded, it is
certain those exposed to liability will become more careful about the
speech they disseminate through the Internet. This will amplify the
consequences of the chilling effect.
217. See id.
218. See Horibe & Middleton, supra note 174, at 230, 239.
219. See generally Mashima & Hirose, supra note 167.
220. See Horibe & Middleton, supra note 174, at 228-30.
221. See id. at 239.
222. See supra Part II.B.
223. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Hooper, supra note 159; see also Thomas Fuller, Big Libel Verdict Upheld in
Malaysia, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4123223.
225. See Hooper, supra note 159.
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2. Lack of Uniform International Law Conflicts with the Potential Use of
the Internet
In ACLU v. Reno 226 the district court recognized the Internet is
considered a stronghold of free speech.227 The court noted "the Internet is a
far more speech-enhancing medium than print, the village green, or the
mails ... . As the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed,
the Internet deserves the highest protection from governmental
intrusion. '' zz  However, as evidenced from the Internet libel cases
discussed above, the Internet is not afforded complete protection from
government regulation in any country.
One must account for the international nature of defamation on the
Internet when considering legal solutions for liability in defamation
lawsuits.2 29 The Internet itself is not situated at any one location, but is
rather a collection of computers around the world.2 30  The Internet
additionally allows almost anyone to publish information,231 which may be
read worldwide.232 Furthermore, there is no way to control where and who
information reaches once published on the Internet.233 Because anything
published on the Internet has the ability to reach a worldwide audience, 34
the potential for damage from a libelous statement is enormous.2 35 Thus,
free speech characteristics inherent in the Internet must be balanced against
the right of freedom from defamation.
As long as countries have variant defamation laws, the economic
consequences of researching all applicable laws and the possibility of
litigating in multiple jurisdictions will chill ISPs from publishing.236
Furthermore, the lack of international law may chill the individual author
from publishing, which may result in suppression of ideas and debate. 37
226. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
227. Id. at 882-83.
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 5, at 183-84.
230. See STREET & GRANT, supra note 4, at xxx.
231. See STREET & GRANT, supra note 4, at xxvii.
232. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 183.
233. See STREET & GRANT, supra note 4, at xxxiii.
234. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 183.
235. See, e.g., id. at 184; see also Holland, supra note 8.
236. Cf Edwards, supra note 5, at 184 (discussing that a defamatory statement can cross
international boundaries).
237. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 197 (discussing the idea that uniform international laws
would help individual users); see also Lidsky, supra note 35, at 887-88 (discussing the idea that
Internet libel suits may chill Internet users).
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Thus, in order to realize the full potential of the Internet, a uniform system
of international law must be implemented.
B. What Should Be Done?
1. Policy Reasons for a Truth-Based Solution
An international system of libel law should focus on correcting the
defamatory statement and providing the public with the truth, rather than
providing a plaintiff with money. A truth-based system would eliminate
much of the consequences of the chilling effect resulting from the
economic burden of current Internet libel law. Such a rule would require
an ISP to publish a retraction of a defamatory statement, similar to
retraction statutes currently in place in the United States.2 Depending on
the jurisdiction, such retraction statutes provide a partial or complete
defense to a traditional (non-ISP) defamation suit by requiring the
publisher to print a rebuttal of the defamatory statement.239
A truth-based system may actually increase the amount of information
published, in contrast to the decrease caused by the chilling effect. An ISP
would theoretically publish more information under a truth-based system
because once published information is held defamatory, the ISP will
attempt to offset damages by publicizing the truth.
Furthermore, an international truth-based system would directly
address the consequences of international Internet publishing. By
implementing a single international approach to libel, the ISP will not be
subjected to laws of multiple jurisdictions. Thus, the ISP would avoid
dealing with many of the economic factors contributing to the chilling
effect. 240 Lessening the fear of economic liability will lead to increased
dissemination of information.
A truth-based system will also better address the needs of the libeled
plaintiff. Generally the libeled plaintiff does not engage in litigation
seeking monetary damages, but rather personal psychological benefit.
24'
The plaintiff seeks to publicly deny the truth of the defamatory
238. See, e.g., Barry J. Waldman, A Unified Approach to Cyber-Libel: Defamation on the
Internet, a Suggested Approach, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 57 (Fall 1999), at
http://www.urich.edu/%7Ejolt/v6i2/note 1 .html (providing an overview of retraction statutes).
239. See id.
240. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 13, at 406.
241. RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET. AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY
161-62 (1987).
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statement. 242 Under a truth-based system, the plaintiff of an Internet libel
action gains repair of their reputation, rather than a sum of money, which
does not redress the harm done.243  Furthermore, in response to the
international nature of the Internet, the repair to the plaintiffs reputation
would occur worldwide.
The Internet is uniquely suited to correcting libelous statements with
the truth. Because publishing on the Internet is inherently less expensive
than traditional modes of publishing, once a statement is labeled
defamatory, an attempt to correct the statement is inexpensive and easy to
disseminate. 44
Some companies have already implemented systems that strive to
correct defamatory statements with the truth.245 In 1995, a user placed a
message on an AOL bulletin board alleging homemade potatoes at Boston
Market were in fact instant potatoes from Sysco. Rather than filing a
lawsuit, Boston Market posted a reply to the same bulletin board saying
"Sysco trucks the potatoes in, but they are not Sysco brand potatoes. They
are whole potatoes. And they really do have big mashers in the back of
every restaurant. ''246 Boston Market's strategy worked thereby avoiding a
possible lawsuit.
247
2. A Proposed International Solution
An international rule on libel law can be broken into three prongs.
The first two prongs could be drawn from the proposed Uniform
Defamation Act. The third prong would address an ISP taking reasonable
steps to correct the defamatory information.
A Uniform Defamation Act was proposed in the United States that
would release domestic computer bulletin board operators from liability if
the operators take reasonable steps to inform users that they do not assert
the truthfulness of the information.248 However, the rule has no provision
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. See STREET & GRANT, supra note 4, at xxvii.
245. See generally L. A. Lorek, Companies Entangled by the Web, Internet an Easy tool for
Corporate Critics, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 3, 1996, available at 1996 WL 2490219 (discussing
Boston Market using the Internet to defend defamatory statements).
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. See Legislative Initiatives Relating to the Standard of Care Issue, at
http://www.ssbb.com/legislat.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2001) (explaining the Feb. 6, 1992 draft of
the Uniform Defamation act was ultimately not approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws); Holland, supra note 8; Jeremy Stone Weber, Defining
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to protect ISPs who seek to publish the truth, but accidentally publish a
defamatory statement. Thus, the consequences of the proposed rule would
have foreseeably added to the chilling effect as an ISP might refuse to
publish a newsworthy statement that could possibly be characterized as
defamatory.
Thus, a more plausible rule would not hold an ISP liable in the
absence of prior notice of the defamatory content. In addition, such a rule
would not hold an ISP liable if: 1) the ISP is not reasonably understood to
assert in the normal course of business the truthfulness of the information;
2) the ISP takes reasonable steps to inform users it does not assert the
truthfulness of the information maintained or transmitted 249 or 3) the ISP
takes reasonable steps after notification of the defamatory content to
correct the content, and concurrently, takes all possible steps to assert the
previously published statement was incorrect.
A caveat of this proposed rule is that actual or punitive damages could
still be awarded if the published retractions were found incapable of
repairing the damaged reputation of the plaintiff. Under this scenario, the
awarded damages could be offset by any repair to the reputation by the ISP
after it learns of the defamatory content.
Although damages would be difficult for a court to determine under
this proposed rule, most courts currently decide damages based on
presumed damage to a person's reputation. Thus, applying such a rule
should not be overly demanding as courts are experienced in making such
assessments.
V. CONCLUSION
The current state of Internet libel law remains far from ideal.
Although some countries refuse to hold ISPs liable for defamatory
statements, others do not. Thus, the current country-by-country approach
to policing Internet libel leaves ISPs with no clear rules to follow.
Consequently, ISPs are chilled from publishing newsworthy information.
The current confusion of rules results in the general public suffering
from the loss of information. If the true potential of the Internet is to be
realized, that of an unbridled forum for international communication, the
current laws of Internet libel must change. The system proposed in this
Comment allows an ISP to correct a defamatory statement with the truth.
This will increase the amount of information disseminated, to the benefit of
Cyberlibel: A First Amendment Limit for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arising from Computer
Bulletin Board Speech, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 235, 260 (1995).
249. Legislative Initiatives Relating to the Standard of Care Issue, supra note 249.
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the public, because the ISP will no longer refrain from publishing for fear
of legal liability.
This Comment proposes one solution to the problem of libel on the
Internet. However, it is the public who must demand a change in the
current approach to policing the Internet in order for the Internet to become
the extraordinary conduit of information of which it is capable.
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